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<H1>Introduction</H1> 
According to Sidney Pollard, the predominant business organizational form in 
preindustrial England was subcontracting, and the building industry was most renowned 
for its usage.1 Generally, Pollard and other historians and management scholars have 
given premodern subcontracting bad press, highlighting its negative business and social 
impacts. Pollard categorized it as cheap substitute for management in an era of personal 
capitalism, one that threatened to deprive emerging businesses of the specialist expertise 
and skills required for innovation.2 Eric Hobsbawm saw that subcontracting systems 
enabled enterprises to respond to variations in supply and demand without increasing 
fixed costs, but viewed them as “co-exploitation,” and highlighted the lack of bargaining 
power of labor within subcontracted hierarchies.3 More recently, British economic and 
social historians have argued for more varied research into production and business 
organization before industrialization. Riello and others have made a case for 
“rehabilitating” subcontracting as a tool of organization flexibility.4 However, although 
the link between subcontracting and the building trades is widely acknowledged, the 
reasons for and specification of subcontracting in construction are not well understood.  
This article seeks to clarify the roles of contracting and subcontracting in the building 
trades in London in the late seventeenth century. It uses the records of the largest 
building projects of the period, mostly commissioned and managed through Sir 
Christopher Wren, to argue that such building contracts were specified to allow strategic 
choice of coordination and mechanism in response to financial and management 
conditions. Moreover, they were used to meet financial objectives.  
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Construction has always relied on the cooperation of discrete specialists—those in 
the traditional “trades” such as carpentry, joinery, masonry, metals, and so on—and 
varied design specialists in engineering and architecture. Thus, the industry has always 
leaned toward vertical disintegration, or a subcontracting model.5 However, historians 
have traditionally treated builders as “artisans,” and thought that firms formed only in 
the nineteenth century.6 Since Elizabeth McKellar shattered artisan myths about 
seventeenth-century London construction, there has been a general understanding that 
throughout the seventeenth century those who undertook the financial risk for work may 
not have been those who carried out the craftsmanship.7 However, even if disintegration 
was the norm, the form of resulting sub (or subsequent) contracts cannot be assumed, 
and the evidence here will show that a number of contracting forms and coordination 
mechanisms were used, which had various and complex purposes.  
The discussion of whether or not subcontracting and contracting systems were 
strategic is important because coordination mechanisms and the form of the firm in early 
modern England are under-researched. Economic historians tend to think of coordination 
mechanisms as undeveloped or “simple structures” before industrialization.8 Although 
notions of English preindustrial management as absent are longstanding, scholars have 
recently begun to understand the late seventeenth century to have been an important 
period of economic growth.9 Historians of management usually view the period before 
1770 as the era of personal capitalism, as defined by Chandler. The characteristics of 
personal capitalism were a lack of separation between ownership and control of a 
commercial enterprise and a “general unwillingness to delegate responsibility to salaried 
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managers.”10 Since later modern economic growth in the nineteenth century is naturally 
associated with the increasing scale and scope of industrialized business, the question 
arises as to whether late seventeenth century growth was affected by changes in 
management.  
Of course, the Chandlerian perspective of business history in regard to the United 
States has been consistently challenged by Scranton.11 Lamoreaux, Temin, and Raff 
subsequently subsumed the associated opposition of markets versus hierarchies with a 
one-dimensional scale between pure market exchange and complete hierarchy, based on 
the permanence of the resulting relationships of the transacting parties. They proposed a 
broad scope typology of coordination, in which independent transacting parties form 
long-term relationships but do not integrate.12 Their continuum offers a conceptual 
solution to a problem encountered by economists and historians who have always noted 
the low occurrence of hierarchies in early modern business. If the relative costs of 
transacting on the market or in the firm dictate the organizational response, a high 
number of transactions in the market implies that the costs of transacting in that market 
are lower than in the firm.13 The usual perception of early modern transaction costs is 
that they were very high.14  
This article tries to establish the view that the costs of transacting were well 
understood by those taking part in contracts for work in Restoration London, and that 
those contracts were a strategic and purposeful response to the transaction costs. Rather 
than an industry that relied on subcontracts as a dereliction of management, as Pollard 
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suggested, contracting was a complex and strategic affair in which conditions and claims 
were actively managed. 
The article proceeds in three sections. The first describes the contracts used by 
Christopher Wren and the City and Crown in the rebuilding of London. The following 
section examines the responses of contractors to business conditions through use of 
archival evidence of the organizational forms used by entrepreneurs who took up these 
contracts. The final section examines the implications of the findings that advanced and 
specified contingent claims contracting enabled a high level of trade credit to facilitate 
works, and that projects could not have been carried out without such credit. It seeks to 
place seventeenth-century construction contracting on Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin’s 
continuum.  
 
<H1>The Contract for Works</H1> 
After the Great Fire of London, the Crown and City invested approximately £1.5 million 
in new churches—including the new St. Paul’s Cathedral—improvements to the Thames 
waterside, Fleet River, and other projects to improve the city and replace lost 
infrastructure.15 The huge works were contracted to various firms in three broad types of 
contract that denominated and mitigated risk in various ways. In practice, these contracts 
for construction protected clients’ and contractors’ interests and incentives.  
Monitoring building work in the seventeenth century was just as problematic as it is 
now.16 Construction is tremendously capital-intensive, yet the quality of the result can 
only be known after the construction process is completed. Construction then and now 
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presents problems of agency, asymmetries of information positively correlated with 
technical complexity, associated asset specificity, sunk costs, and moral hazard. Large-
scale projects create even larger asymmetries of information. Prior performance or even 
very good information may not indicate whether the money will be best spent on one 
contractor over another. Moreover, as some of the industry-specific literature attests, the 
process of building creates more than resolves problems.17 The associated relations are 
complicated further due to necessarily intensive capital needs. Colvin, Mordaunt Crook, 
and Downes put it plainly when they wrote: “War and building are two of the most 
expensive activities in which governments can engage.”18  
A further challenge in large-scale infrastructure or architectural development more 
generally, especially in the period under review, is idiosyncrasy. Large buildings are by 
definition usually one-offs—for example, most of Wren’s projects were unique and 
untried designs—which brings further complexity to organization. Various aspects of 
technical development and design will call for the expertise and management services of 
consultants, architects, surveyors, or engineers. These agents act for and on behalf of 
clients or owners, but they can compound agency problems through clan-like 
relationships with contractors.19 Information and other assets developed specific to one 
development may not be tried or as useful again to other clients. Such idiosyncrasies add 
to risk and to cost. It is well recognized that some of these costs are peculiar to the 
building industry.20 
Accurate estimation of the cost of works was a challenge throughout most of the 
eighteenth century, even though it was a stated goal of those who commissioned new 
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building early in the seventeenth century.21 As Roger Pratt, one of the most influential 
architects of the seventeenth century said: “That all expenses be reduced to a certainty, 
both as to Materials and Worke, as far as possible may be & no man to be left at Random 
of ye Day Labour; whose artifice will be so to protract ye Work as to make it an 
inheritance.”22 As greater investment was made in construction, participants mitigated the 
problems of risk and asymmetry of information through applying varied “ways of 
working,” which were, for all intents and purposes, organizational responses to the risks 
of investing in construction. As Sir Christopher Wren explained: 
 
<EXT>There are 3 ways of working: by the Day, by Measure and by Great; if 
by day it tells me when they are Lazy. If by measure it gives me light on every 
particular and tells me what I am to provide. If by the Great I can make a sure 
bargain neither to be overreached nor to hurt the undertaker; for in things they 
are not every day used to, they doe often injure themselves and when they 
begin to find it, they shuffle and slight the work to save themselves. I think the 
best way in this business is to worke by measure: according to the prices in 
the estimate or lower if you can and measure the work in 3 or 4 measurements 
as it rises. But you must have a trusty measurer, there are few that are skilled 
in measuring stone worke, I have bred up 2 or 3.23</EXT> 
 
Sir Wren wrote the above in 1681 to John Fell, Bishop of Oxford, when he was 
undertaking the erection of Tom Tower at Christchurch College, Oxford. The “three ways 
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of working” are oft-quoted but less as a statement of management strategy than as a 
description of seventeenth-century custom. Wren recognized that possible means of 
contracting had different incentives and costs associated with them, which he identified 
as different types of transaction costs.24 In “day work,” the client paid for labor on an 
ongoing basis, but the lack of an incentive to finish quickly was obvious: the client might 
have paid unproductive workers, with few monitoring opportunities to prevent this lack 
of work. In contracting “by the great,” the risk was that a contractor misestimated or 
knowingly underbid to win the work. This risked unfinished work, large sunk costs, and 
poor workmanship when the contractor realized the potential loss.  
In “measured work,” contractors agreed to supply both materials and labor to produce 
finished work measured in units. Wren advised negotiating a price as low as possible for 
agreed units of finished work, ongoing evaluation of work, and paying out in stages. In 
essence, measured work was a “payment by results” contract with a stop option. This 
option offered a system of buying fixed amounts of specified work with associated costs 
and built-in monitoring. Thus, contractors built the required end-product in given units; a 
rod of brickwork, a foot of carving, and so on, and clients only paid for the work when 
the units had been measured or surveyed as complete as per the contract by a qualified 
measurer.25 If all was as specified, the clients paid the agreed price. If, however, the work 
was found unsatisfactory, the client reserved the right to reduce the price or have the 
work made good at the contractor’s expense. A measured contract incentivized a 
contractor to provide the best-quality materials and the best skills within the price 
offered, but no more. If he over-promised skills or materials, then he would lose margin 
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on the unit price, but if he under-delivered he might lose the cost of the whole unit. 
Because the measures could be small or large units, any deviation from the costs of input 
or quality of output could be rectified before large sunk costs were incurred. An 
experienced or knowledgeable contractor would work to get the output at acceptable 
inputs, as monitoring was both time-consuming and expensive.  
Later in the eighteenth century, measures and prices became standardized and the 
Office of the King’s Works monitored projects on a basis of “measure and value.” 
However, in the seventeenth century, measurement was adapted to individual conditions 
and projects.26 Measurement was the process of verifying or evaluating the measures or 
units of work completed. It was carried out for the client’s benefit by surveyors or clerks-
of-works, usually at fixed or preagreed points in the work schedule, such as monthly or 
quarterly.27 Given the risk to their profit, contractors also hired their own measurers.28 
Thus, the practice of measuring was the predecessor to modern quantity surveying.29  
For the client, one of the benefits of working through a measured contract was that 
the system was essentially self-monitoring.30 The contractor’s risk of already incurred 
costs going unpaid or prices being renegotiated ensured quality workmanship for the 
client; however, good quality might lead to further contracting work for the contractor. 
Measured work not only divided large contracts or tasks into measured pieces but also 
allowed for the transfer of information between the parties on performance and costs.31 
Contractors working under measured contracts were incentivized to drive down the costs 
of inputs, but only to the point at which quality could still be assured. If the contractors 
found they could not keep to the terms of the contract and still earn profits, then they 
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could choose to not complete further measures; essentially this stopped a continuing loss, 
which would not be possible if they were tied to contracts by the great or by the task.  
Obviously, a key benefit of measured work for the client was financial. Little to no 
money was paid until the work was verified as completed to the required standard. The 
contractor bore all the risks of construction, which, in the cases reviewed below, they 
knew could be easily overcome through their skill, networks, and experience. By 
agreeing to work now and accepting payment later, the contractor bore the costs of 
financing of the construction, but measured contracts allowed for effective pricing of 
these costs.  
Thus, complexity and flexibility were built into the system before any type of 
subcontracts were considered. It seems likely that the type of contract for works 
determined how a subcontract would proceed. Day, measure, and great types of contract 
were modified to suit individual clients and projects. Campbell identified six types of 
contracts: (1) straight day work, (2) day rates advanced and then deducted, (3) by 
measure with and (4) without materials, (5) by great solely for labor, and by (6) great 
with materials.32 The six types—and there were probably subsets and variations even of 
these—strongly indicate that contracting for high-value building work was the product of 
not just advanced engineering and aesthetic design but also advanced sets of 
organizational techniques and process designs. Both clients and contractors thought in 
strategic ways about the best way to design the process of building, which would affect 
the most profitable outcome and, of course, included value for money. As I will show, it 
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probably also included the price of money itself, because in the Stuart period, the entire 
system rested on the use of these contracts as credit agreements.  
For St. Paul’s Cathedral and Greenwich Hospital, two large Wren projects, the 
written contracts show clearly how measurement, or risk management, was at the center 
of the arrangement. Contracts gave the client the right to monitor work, to appoint an 
inspector of work externally (if need be), and to reduce or not pay the full amount if the 
quality stipulated was not met.33 Contracts for several parts of a project were written to 
specify the contractor’s duties to supply work at specific prices until the building was 
completed. Contracts for building St. Paul’s, for example, were renewed frequently or 
passed on to a subsequent contractor. This type of contracting gave clients a further 
mechanism to discipline contractors. By renewing contracts for the same work, a single, 
large project turned into one in which a contractor needed to retain the client’s trust 
across repeated transactions, which offered a counterweight to contractor opportunism.34 
The key elements of a typical contract of the period can be observed in one dated July 
1675, in which Joshua Marshall undertook to lay the foundations of St. Paul’s Cathedral: 
 
<EXT>When one hundredth Rod is wrought, & ye same certified by Mr Edward 
Woodruff & allowed by Sir Christopher Wren Knt, so much lawful English 
money as ye said one hundred Rods of Work shall amount to after ye Rates 
foresaid, and so proportionally for every one hundred Rods of Work, as ye work 
goes on until measurement be made of the whole, & when the said severall works 
shall be well and sufficiently done, & approved of, then the said J. M., his Exors, 
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or Assigns, shall receive so much more as the said Work upon a Just measurement 
thereof had made & shall justly amount.35</EXT> 
 
The contract specifies the stone to use and the dimensions, and that Marshall would be 
paid by measurement and be able to claim funds. The degree to which the authority in 
measured contracts was put in the hands of a client’s agents was by no means unusual. 
Also not unusual were the idiosyncratic stipulations, which was a prevailing 
characteristic in the contracts. For example, the contract with Thomas Gilbert and 
Thomas Wise to provide the Portland stone to St. Paul’s stipulates: 
 
<EXT>At their own proper cost and charges, for and in consideration of the rates 
and prices hereafter mentioned, raise, scaple, prepare, and cause to be delivered 
on board such vessels as they can procure to take ye freight such and so much 
Portland Stone, as they shall be directed to prepare & send from the Isle of 
Portland to such Wharfe in the Port of London below Bridge as shall be 
appointed. And shall scappell the said stone according to the moulds and 
directions both for the fashion and the number of stones[…]. […] [A]and give 
account from time to time of the Marks and Measures of the said stone therein 
[…]. […] [A]nd shall take care that all Stone by truelly scappelled, not wanting of 
ye moulds at the corners or sides, also that the said stone be well conditioned and 
proper for use intended, without flinty beds or rag beds or clay holes near the 
faces of the stone.”36 
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In other words, Gilbert and Wise bore all the risks of producing the product to the 
cathedral’s exact specification. Other than to try to amend the terms in subsequent 
contracts or tasks, they had no recourse to ask for costs to be covered if production did 
not go according to plan. In March 1685, it was noted that Gilbert and Wise billed the 
cathedral for “mending of wayes, for Crain ropes, and other such like Charges.” The 
Cathedral’s commissioners were of the opinion that these costs were to be borne by the 
contractors. Disputes over charges and costs are a consistent theme in the accounting 
records of constructing St. Paul’s.37  
At Greenwich Hospital, a similar approach can be seen in contracts, which clearly 
specified monitoring, incentives, and deduction systems. On June 5, 1696, the Hospital 
Fabric Committee recorded that “agreement was made with Daniel Foe of the Parish of 
Islington, Brick maker’ to ‘burn and supply’” from time to time: 
 
<Ext>[B]ricks, delivering the same to the wharf near the workes, and if a 
considerable part of any load … appear to be clinkered or otherwise unprofitable 
for the use of the work it shall be lawfull for the clarke of the works to reject or 
turn back such ill goods, 14 shilling the thousand for stock and 25 shillings the 
thousand for rubbing bricks contract in force for this summer only.38 </EXT> 
 
In other words, the hospital avoided the risk of paying for defective goods that might be 
accidently included or hidden in large-scale deliveries, including damages that arose from 
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transportation. Presumably, everyone involved was clear about when the season ended, 
which was probably Michaelmas. Also on June 5, Thomas Hues and Richard 
Billinghurst, bricklayers, agreed to a price of £1 7s per rod for new brickwork. Again, the 
contract included a quality specification, for which failure to comply meant nonpayment:  
 
<EXT>Rubbing and setting the straight arches being brick and half deep and one 
brick thick twelve pence a foot running and they shall find all workmanship 
making up of mortar well-tempered mixed and beaten and all scaffolding and 
towards scaffolding they are to be allowed £15.39<EXT> 
 
On June 13, 1696, a contract was made with Thomas Hill and Edward Strong “to 
perform that masons worke.” A condition of the contract was that Strong and Hill would 
manage their supply and work schedule with other contractors: “[T]he said masons do 
agree to keep as many workmen and labourers as the surveyor of the said work shall 
think reasonable for the carrying on the same with the brickwork so that they not be 
obstructed.”40 It is not known when Hill stepped away from the partnership, but by May 
1698 Strong was contracting alone for the stone work at the wharf next to the hospital.41 
There was also a contract with James Grove, a carpenter, who was expected to retain 
other contractors: “James Grove by himselfe servants and workmen finding all materials, 
workmanship and labour will performe and finish in goode, such carpenter work as shall 
be directed by the surveyor of the said work.”42 
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As noted above, the predominant approach to contracting for building projects 
appears to have been for clients to write detailed contracts for set amounts of work and 
then either to renew them or add contracts as the project moved on to new parts of the 
work. As also noted above, clan-like relationships occurred. The records of St. Paul’s 
show that sometimes contracts were inherited or passed from one contractor to another. 
For example, in 1700, Edward Pearce’s contract succeeded Joshua Marshall’s contract; 
Thomas Wise Junior and Thomas Hill’s contract succeeded Thomas Wise Senior’s 
contract; Nathanial Rawlins’s contract succeeded Joshua Latham’s contract; and William 
Kempster’s contract succeeded John Thompson’s contract.43  
Individual contractors also could have several contracts in force at any one time for a 
single client. As with brickmaker Foe’s contract with Greenwich Hospital, a contract 
could be limited but with risks clearly set out. For another example, an agreement with 
Edward Strong Senior and Edward Strong Junior included: 
 
<EXT>The said Masons in consideration of such sums of money to be paid them 
[…] as that become due to them … upon the several admeasurements of their 
work and stating the accounts for the same according to the rates and prices […] 
do for themselves […] agree with the said Directors […] that they will perform 
the same well and workmanlike according to their deft skill and ability finding all 
materials of stone, Lime sand, making of mortar, scaffolding, hoisting, lifting and 
all other necessary relating thereto except iron work which shall be found by the 
Hospital.</EXT> 
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Although the father and son had already committed to giving detailed accounts for 
measurement only for monies to become due to them (but not paid), the contract then 
stated exact prices for worked Portland marble, paving, and other specific works, which 
negated any possibilities for extra margin. The contract ends with the Strongs agreeing to 
an open-ended penalty if they and the commissioners could not agree on the quality of 
the work, even if they had already incurred the costs of labor and supplies. 
 
<EXT>And the said Masons do further agree that if any part of the work 
when performed shall appear to be deficient either in goods [or] materials 
performance or quantity they will submit to such […] action as Sir Chris 
Wren and the Directors for the said Hospital shall think fit. In with & whereof 
the said Edward Strong Snr and Edward Strong Jun. have hereunto set their 
hand this 10th day of October 1706.</EXT>44 
 
In summary, in seventeenth-century London, building contracts were not uniform, but 
carefully specified and idiosyncratic. Some were deceptively simple. There seem to have 
been few standard clauses, although there was an increasing reliance on a mutually 
agreed system of measurement (discussed below). Today’s reader will notice that many 
of the expectations provided for in contemporary contracts are absent. For instance, time-
dependant clauses are conspicuously uncommon: By what date would the work be 
completed? Contracts of the period also did not specify how disagreements would be 
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resolved, or who would arbitrate: Was the client always right? There is one consistent 
theme, however. The contracts identify and specify the perceived risks to the client in the 
process of building, and they make the contractor responsible for those risks. Contracts 
clearly stated that clients would not pay until they deemed the work done to be 
satisfactory or problems overcome. Only contractors with large amounts of capital, strong 
networks, and reliable supply chains could bear such risks, financially or operationally.  
 
<H1>Contractors</H1> 
At the organizations and in the networks run by Wren, his protégés, and the Office of the 
King’s Works, there was a clear preference for working with contractors and suppliers 
already known, which reduced the costs of transacting by drawing on relational capital.45 
The firms contracted to build St. Paul’s were some of the most established business in 
the building trades. As the project evolved over time, the relationships were notable. The 
first contracted masons were Joshua Marshall, who ran one of London’s largest 
workshops, and Thomas Wise, an established player in the London market. The largest 
proportion of the contracted works (over £50,000) went to Thomas Strong and his 
brother, Edward. Edward and his son (also Edward) created a powerful construction 
dynasty that survived into the 1730s. Edward Strong is well known for partnerships with 
Christopher Kempster, who Wren esteemed highly, and the Kempsters and the Strongs 
often partnered, as did their apprentices, protégés, and offspring; this occurred so 
frequently that the two firms are often coupled by researchers.46 Other contractors that 
worked for Wren were similarly well networked. Edward Tufnell, master mason at 
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Westminster Abbey, had apprenticed with Christopher Kempster, and his daughter 
married the son of Samuel Fulkes, another St. Paul’s contractor. The result was probably 
a network of relations with several features of bilateral monopoly (which is often 
discussed as a feature of construction contracting) and collusion.47  
There were a surprising number of female building contractors. Most were 
widows of contracted craftsmen, but the institutional invoices dispel traditional ideas of 
widows as passive caretakers of family capital waiting for a son to take over the 
business. The records of Westminster Abbey show that Elizabeth Gregory was 
contracting, estimating, attending meetings, and carrying out carpentry work throughout 
the 1710s with her son. Likewise, Sarah Spoore, widow of a smith, was contracted for 
Westminster Abbey in the same period as her son, who was a separate contractor.48  
It is apparent that many of these firms were dynastic, but assumptions about 
“personal capitalism” are not useful in analyzing business practices because it is also 
apparent that these business owners used many different forms of coordination 
mechanism. For instance, the day books of William Kempster (son of Christopher), a 
major contractor at St. Paul’s from 1700 to 1715, show that he paid large numbers of 
men by the day in ongoing employment relationships, even when his contract was by the 
measure.49 Some men worked a very high number of days for him—in excess of 260 per 
year, which could be described as regular employment. Others worked for him only for a 
small number of days—less than 100—and other names appear for only four or six days 
total. These men may have been specialists or simply did work out as part of the team. 
Such variation is typical of stage-dependent production and implies a flexible hierarchy. 
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Such flexibility in employment terms and practice applied both to laborers and highly 
skilled carvers, free of the City of London (i.e., having citizenship and a right to trade), 
who had their own apprentices and possibly had their own task-based contracts.  
There is evidence that there were subteams,50 and that some men worked for several 
contractors. There are also indications that ancillary services as well as specialist work 
were carried out on subcontracts. Marshall and many others operating in and around the 
City had significant statuary mason businesses that sold commemorative and decorative 
stonework and sculpture. In fact, many of the well-known contractors who worked on 
large projects, such as the London Bridge, City churches, or Westminster Abbey were 
described as artists and sculptors. However, given the time it took to run their businesses, 
it seems likely that the work attributed to these contractor-artists was actually done by 
employees or subcontractors.51 Their workshops would have had carvers, foremen, and 
assisting staff who were hired regularly or by piecework contract. Many of these large 
contractors were also involved in residential building leases and speculative 
development, which added to their responsibilities.52  
Also, many took up positions with large institutions to manage works or be approved 
suppliers. For instance, at London Bridge, contractors paid hundreds of pounds to secure 
positions such as “Tide Carpenter,” “Land Carpenter,” or “Purveyor.” This not only 
entitled the contractor to employ men and supply materials but also to subcontract others 
to fulfill maintenance requirements at the bridge, presumably at a rate to offer return on 
investment. However, in taking up the position the contractor became subject to the 
hierarchy of the bridgemaster’s administration and to scrutiny over business affairs 
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generally.53 This does not seem to have put a brake on subcontracting, however. Thomas 
Wise was a mason on London Bridge while supplying stone to St. Paul’s Cathedral.  
These large contractors were entrepreneurs in the Knightian sense, as margin on 
many of the measures or tasks could only be gained by making experienced calculations 
for both uncertainty and risk.54 As seen in the contracts discussed above, clients specified 
risks they wished to avoid. However, they were also contracting out the uncertainty that 
the process of building entailed by stipulating that payment would be made only when 
the work was done to order. Many contractors, possibly in response to such uncertainty, 
were involved in multiple joint ventures on construction contracts. For instance, Tufnell 
partnered with Strong on six City churches after 1712, even as Strong maintained other 
contracts and Tufnell was contracted at Westminster Abbey. In each of Strong’s 
partnerships, different carpenters and bricklayers were involved.55 This might give the 
impression that contracts were easy to enter into. However, some contractors new to a 
client relationship appear to have paid a bond to secure a contract. For instance, Edward 
Stanton, who owned an established statuary and mason yard in Holborn, put up £2,000 to 
become the contracting mason to Westminster Abbey after 1719.56 As with London 
Bridge, presumably the profits earned justified the bond.  
Although it seems that contractors took on all the risk and covered their margin 
alone, they could profit through measurement. A measured contract fixed an upper 
bound of profitability on any one job because if the price of the goods or inputs were 
bounded, profit could not exceed the difference between those prices at supply and at 
sale, less overhead, labor, financing, and operating costs; however, it also acted as a 
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stop-loss because the potential loss was limited to the scope of only that measurement. In 
agreeing to a measured contract, the contractor would have to know how to get the 
inputs at a price low enough to make the measurement profitable and how to calculate 
costs to meet projected margins. If costs remained low as compared with the client’s set 
price, or competitor’s prices, a contractor could profit enormously. Experienced 
contractors priced a measured contract to ensure enough margin to operate and profit 
either immediately or in the long run through future contracts after relations were 
established. If one measurement lost the contractor a large sum, then prices, measures, 
and inputs would be adapted in the next contract, or the contract might simply be 
rescinded. Thus, for contractors, measurement was a long-term risk-management 
strategy that limited sunk costs and enabled them to monitor and manage production to 
meet margins.  
Not all building contracts followed the simplicity adhered to by Wren and his 
protégés, as illustrated in the examples above. City contracts for the building of the 
Mansion House in the 1730s show a high specificity in listing exact requirements and 
obligations.57 Records do not show if complete contracts were performed or 
renegotiated, but the case is highlighted here to show that contracting outside of the 
Office of the King’s Works or for the Crown may have been costlier. Making further 
conclusions about the development in contract specificity, accuracy, or efficiency would 
require research with a large universe of contracts. However, the general method for 
contracting work was found in all enterprises, not just construction. Bills and contracts 
for “worke done” or goods supplied at fixed prices per unit were how everything, from 
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peas and salt delivered to Greenwich Hospital to experimental metallurgy for the 
Monument to the Great Fire of London, was contracted.58  
One of the quirks long noted about the accounts of these types of projects is the high 
incidence of extremely late payments to contractors.59 In effect, the form of contract 
provided project finance for the client. After an estimate was agreed and work had 
started, contractors submitted measured or task bills monthly, quarterly, or biannually. 
At Westminster Abbey, payment was made biannually for most of the eighteenth 
century. At St. Paul’s, there were monthly and quarterly reckoning and payment systems. 
The paymaster or treasurer would receive a bill and pass it to the surveyor or the clerk of 
the Office of the King’s Works for approval. To approve a measured bill, a clerk had to 
ensure the work met the specifications by appointing a surveyor to measure and evaluate 
the work done, or measure it if himself if qualified.60 Only after everything was 
measured did the bill get passed (or money deducted), and it went back to the treasurer to 
be signed and eventually paid by the paymaster.  
Delays in payment were so common as to be ordinary, persistent, and, it seems, 
expected. In fact, late payment or trade credit was part and parcel of the system of 
contracting. Colvin and colleagues wrote that at the Office of King’s Works, no works 
account was ever audited, no final sums were paid in less than two years of finalization 
of work, and there were some delays of up to ten years: “It was the artificers who bore 
the problem.”61 There was even more credit overdue than Colvin et al. supposed. In 1702 
the Office of the King’s Works owed £57,910 to 106 suppliers, but £46,854 of it was due 
to just eighteen of them. Payments at Westminster Abbey from 1712 to 1719 varied from 
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seven to twenty-three months after a bill was submitted, and work would have been 
carried out up to six months before that.62 In 1720 Edward Strong was still owed £8,461 
on his 1715–1716 contract for Greenwich Hospital. In 1713 Christopher Wren and two 
other surveyors noted late payment for repairs of the Mews at Charing Cross to thirteen 
contractors between 1709 and 1711. By the time payment was made, contractors for this 
work had waited more than four years for payment and had also agreed to substantial 
deductions.63 
In 1692 a deal was “offered” to contractors whereby the Office of the King’s Works 
would pay 6 percent to those who would advance double the amount outstanding by 
way of a loan to that office.64 In other words, late payments had become so bad the 
Office of the King’s Works was forced to pay 6 percent interest to maintain credit—but 
these interest rates were available only to those contractors who were already out of 
pocket and could advance more capital to the office. Contractors who awaited payment 
were paid in Treasury “tallies”—tickets or vouchers—which were like a form of 
promissory note. Those who could not afford any further delay in getting paid could sell 
these tallies—at a discount—as a secondary market developed, of which some officers 
of the Office of the King’s Works took advantage.65 The consequences for clients’ 
perennial lack of cash and late payments were “bad credit and disadvantageous terms.”66  
However, given the scale of the problem, the degree to which credit seems to have 
been extraordinarily good is notable. Contractors who were owed large sums, with no 
firm date for payment or debt agreement, continued to lend to the Crown—or the Office 
of the King’s Works—and bid for work at prices competitive enough to be awarded 
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contracts over competitors. It is likely that cash flow from other parts of their businesses 
such as materials supply or residential building projects subsidized the long-term credit 
owed to their public works business.67  
Further consequences for the contractors are likely to have been problems in their 
supply chain or subcontracts. How did they manage payment terms with suppliers and 
subcontractors when they themselves were not paid? A letter book of Andrews Jelfe, a 
principal mason contractor on Westminster Bridge, gives some insight. It shows that in 
1735, Jelfe was still dealing with unpaid bills for work done in 1727 from a previous 
partnership with Christopher Cass (the contracting mason on St. Martin in the Fields). It 
also shows the intricacies and complexities of managing supply chains over distance and 
with various parties. In the first part of the book, there are payment records for a stable 
team of masons and workers for 1734–1735. The second half of the book is mostly 
taken up with copies and drafts of correspondence, sometimes many times a week, to 
Mr. Roper, who was Jelfe’s agent in the West country after 1738. Jelfe faced ongoing 
problems with quarrymen Messrs. Tizard and Bryer over the delivery of stone for 
Westminster Bridge. Many of the letters include instructions to Roper on evaluating 
sourcing alternatives or how Tizard and Bryer could be persuaded to produce what was 
needed. Roper received instructions on sizes of stone, cutting, and carriage directions. 
Jelfe also wrote to him regularly to advise him of contract developments. In July and 
August 1743, work on the bridge was not going according to plan, and Jelfe warned 
Roper to lay off men (his “many hands”): “I am sorry there is no work for them here.”68 
It is not clear what the contractual arrangement between Roper and Jelfe was, and 
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whether Roper was paid for his time or on some kind of commission, but the 
correspondence does highlight the varied coordination arrangements required of Jelfe. 
Although the role of book credit is frequently referred to, its effects on the economy 
more generally are still to be pinned down by either economic, financial, or business 
historians.69 Contracting institutions and businesses of any kind were engaged in a 
wholesale exchange of negotiable paper credit, much of which may have been resold or 
reconciled without ever becoming monetized. In some sense, a contract was only the 
right to carry out work, and the right to bill for it, and the residual claims that the 
contractor could extract were a result not only of the product of their work but also the 
ability to enforce those claims. Effective contracting was both a matter of keeping the 
costs of inputs low to ensure margin, but primarily to keep the terms of credit running. 
The contractor with the best price and the highest margin would be one whose supply 
chain held up and who could trade bills without having to take any deductions.  
 
<H1>Implications</H1>  
There are a number of implications in the building contracts of the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries related to the institutions and organizations of business and 
finance in London before 1800. 
First, although there has not been a great deal of inquiry into the “simple structures”70 
of personal capitalism in England before 1750, the evidence here suggests that just as 
Scranton showed for the nineteenth century in the United States, the road to later “scale 
and scope” was paved with varied, flexible, and innovative enterprises (of course, the 
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construction industry has always featured small enterprises).71 Enterprises remained 
multifarious even in periods of booming demand and consumption. Moreover, although 
one can discern a clear relationship between the contracts and costs of transacting, the 
resultant organizational forms were affected by multiple contingencies—personal, 
institutional, social, and financial, among others.72  
Although the rebuilding of London coincided with the beginning of England’s 
Financial Revolution, these enterprises seem to have garnered and leveraged large capital 
sums without resort to capital markets or banks; indeed, they were sources of finance for 
the City and Crown. Evidence indicates firmly that contracts for work were really 
contracts for work and finance; that is, transactional costs of capital and management 
were transferred into financial risk, which was priced and undertaken by experienced 
building contractors.  
It is possible to gain insight into management and productivity in this period by 
examining measured contracts rather than “firms”. Individual contractor entrepreneurs 
were often involved in multiple contracts, but due to their differing limits and 
specifications, the boundaries of the firm were indistinguishable. The contractor-
entrepreneur had a number of possible organizational and flexible employment responses, 
along with high levels of finance. It is thus unsurprising that they helped make 
institutional changes that influenced contracting. In particular, a system of measurement 
led to innovation and changes in construction productivity. In today’s world, institutional 
measurement is the foundation for all modern quantity surveying, valuation, and design 
in architecture and construction.  
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The system of measurement, first developed in the seventeenth century, allowed 
clients and contractors to price and transact highly idiosyncratic, expensive work with a 
high percentage of sunk costs at the outset, which benefitted both parties. It allowed 
clients to make terms; monitor progress; reduce negligence and agency problems; and 
pass many of the search, transactional, and operational costs to the contractor. 
Measurement also allowed a primary contractor to adequately price costs and risks in 
units and charge for finance, and so effectively subcontract and fix bounds to a downside 
or loss in any ongoing project or relationship. In the period of rebuilding after the Great 
Fire, it also allowed clients to borrow from contractors, because the process of 
measurement was sufficiently protracted to delay payment under the auspices of 
“process,” which thus delayed admitting to a lack of funds. It allowed lenders to set the 
price for their money or capital, and it encouraged them to do so competitively. However, 
although the system of measurement provided an effective monitor and easier funding for 
the client, it will never be possible to accurately quantify what it cost them.  
Measurement and the type of building contracts discussed here were not customary 
ways to account for building work; instead, they were management tools used to 
minimize risk, secure financing, and ensure quality with a minimum of monitoring and 
bargaining. Although a great deal is written about early modern credit, the scale of the 
lending and duration of loans to the Office of the King’s Works are a world away from 
the smaller-scale trade credit that features predominantly in the literature.73 Mutually 
agreed practices and institutions financed large-scale investment without any banking 
support or financial intermediaries. Credit was part and parcel of contracting, so financial 
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valuations of interest are only partially useful in understanding the costs of this kind of 
early modern trade credit.  
Seventeenth-century building contractors had a number of coordination mechanisms 
at their disposal, and their choice was related to the contract terms under which work was 
to be carried out. Most contracts were agreed and governed outside of a what is 
understood as a hierarchy (Figure 1). Costs were minimized through relational capital and 
the evolution of and cooperation in new systems, such as measurement. The financing of 
work was also dependent on the contract type. Seventeenth-century building contracts 
should be seen as forming an emergent system that has minimized transaction costs in a 
highly capital-intensive business, through to today’s architectural practice and quantity 
surveying. Measurement and building contracts belie the view that seventeenth-century 
English business organizations were simple structures before industrialization. 
 
<CAP>Figure 1. Types of exchange and contracts, markets, and hierarchy scale</CAP> 
<FFN> Source: Lamoureaux, Raff, and Temin (2003). </FFN> 
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